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Abstract— SQL injection is a type of attack which the attacker 
adds Structured Query Language code to a web form input 
box to gain access or make changes to data. SQL injection 
vulnerability allows an attacker to flow commands directly to a 
web application's underlying database and destroy 
functionality or confidentiality. Researchers have proposed 
different tools to detect and prevent this vulnerability. In this 
paper we present all SQL injection attack types and also 
current tools which can detect or prevent these attacks. Finally 
we evaluate these tools. 
Keyword: SQL Injection Attacks, detection, prevention, tool, 
evaluation. 
1.   INTRODUCTION  
Web applications are often vulnerable to attacks, which 
can give attackers easily access to the application's 
underlying database. SQL injection attack occurs when a 
malicious user, through specifically crafted input, causes a 
web application to generate and send a query that functions 
differently than the programmer intended. 
 
SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIAs) have known as one of 
the most common threats to the security of database-driven 
applications. So there is not enough assurance for 
confidentiality and integrity of this information. SQLIA is a 
class of code injection attacks that take advantage of lack of 
user input validation. In fact, attackers can shape their 
illegitimate input as parts of final query string which operate 
by databases. Financial web applications or secret 
information systems could be the victims of this vulnerability 
because attackers by abusing this vulnerability can threat 
their authority, integrity and confidentiality. So, developers 
addressed some defensive coding practices to eliminate this 
vulnerability but they are not sufficient. 
 
For preventing the SQLIAs, defensive coding has been 
offered as a solution but it is very difficult. Not only 
developers try to put some controls in their source code but 
also attackers continue to bring some new ways to bypass 
these controls. Hence it is difficult to keep developers up to 
date, according the last and the best defensive coding 
practices. On the other hand, implementing of best practice 
of defensive coding is very difficult and need to special 
skills. These problems motivate the need for a solution to the 
SQL injection problem.  
 
Researchers have proposed some tools to help developers 
to compensate the shortcoming of the defensive coding [7, 
10, 12]. The problem is that some current tools could not 
address all attack types or some of them need special 
deployment requirements. 
 
     The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we define 
SQL Injection attack. In section3 we present different SQLI 
attack types. In section 4 we review current tools against 
SQLI. In section 5 we evaluate SQL Injection detection 
or/and prevention tools against all types of SQL injection 
attacks and deployment requirements. Conclusion and future 
work is provided in section 6. 
2.  DEFINITION OF SQLIA  
Most web applications today use a multi-tier design, 
usually with three tiers: a presentation, a processing and a 
data tier. The presentation tier is the HTTP web interface, the 
application tier implements the software functionality, and 
the data tier keeps data structured and answers to requests 
from the application tier [21]. Meanwhile, large companies 
developing SQL-based database management systems rely 
heavily on hardware to ensure the desired performance 
[22].SQL injection is a type of attack which the attacker adds 
Structured Query Language code to input box of a web form 
to gain access or make changes to data. SQL injection 
vulnerability allows an attacker to flow commands directly to 
a web application's underlying database and destroy 
functionality or confidentiality.  
 
2.1 SQL injection attack process 
SQLIA is a hacking technique which the attacker adds 
SQL statements through a web application's input fields or 
hidden parameters to access to resources. Lack of input 
validation in web applications causes hacker to be 
successful. For the following examples we will assume that a 
web application receives a HTTP request from a client as 
input and generates a SQL statement as output for the back 
end database server. 
 
For example an administrator will be authenticated after 
typing: employee id=112 and password=admin. Figure1 
describes a login by a malicious user exploiting SQL 
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phases:  
 
1.  an attacker sends the malicious HTTP request to the 
web application 
2.  creates the SQL statement 
3.  submits the SQL statement to the back end database 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of a SQL Injection Attack 
  
The above SQL statement is always true because of the 
Boolean tautology we appended (OR 1=1) so, we will access 
to the web application as an administrator without knowing 
the right password. 
 
2.2  Main cause of SQL injection 
 
Web application vulnerabilities are the main causes of 
any kind of attack [19]. In this section, vulnerabilities that 
might exist naturally in web applications and can be 
exploited by SQL injection attacks will be presented: 
 
Invalidated input: This is almost the most common 
vulnerability on performing a SQLIA. There are some 
parameters in web application, are used in SQL queries. If 
there is no any checking for them so can be abused in SQL 
injection attacks. These parameters may contain SQL 
keywords, e.g. INSERT, UPDATE or SQL control 
characters such as quotation marks and semicolons. 
 
Generous privileges: Normally in database the 
privileges are defined as the rules to state which database 
subject has access to which object and what operation are 
associated with user to be allowed to perform on the objects. 
Typical privileges include allowing execution of actions, e.g. 
SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, DROP, on certain 
objects. Web applications open database connections using 
the specific account for accessing the database. An attacker 
who bypasses authentication gains privileges equal to the 
accounts. The number of available attack methods and 
affected objects increases when more privileges are given to 
the account. the worst case happen If an account can connect 
to system that is associated with the system administrator 
because normally has all privileges. 
 
Uncontrolled variable size: If variables allow storage of 
data be larger than expected consequently allow attackers to 
enter modified or faked SQL statements. Scripts that do not 
control variable length may even open the way for attacks, 
such as buffer overflow. 
 
Error message: Error messages that are generated by the 
back-end database or other server-side programs may be 
returned to the client-side and presented in the web browser. 
These messages are not only useful during development for 
debugging purposes but also increase the risks to the 
application. Attackers can analyze these messages to gather 
information about database or script structure in order to 
construct their attack. 
 
Variable Orphism: The variable should not accept any 
data type because attacker can exploit this feature and store 
malicious data inside that variable rather than is suppose to 
be. Such variables are either of weak type, e.g. variables in 
PHP, or are automatically converted from one type to 
another by the remote database.  
 
Dynamic SQL: SQL queries dynamically built by scripts 
or programs into a query string. Typically, one or more 
scripts and programs contribute and finally by combining 
user input such as name and password, make the WHERE 
clauses of the query statement. The problem is that query 
building components can also receive SQL keywords and 
control characters. It means attacker can make a completely 
different query than what was intended. 
 
Client-side only control: If input validation is 
implemented in client-side scripts only, then security 
functions of those scripts can be overridden using cross-site 
scripting. Therefore, attackers can bypass input validation 
and send invalidated input to the server-side. 
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Stored procedures: They are statements which are 
stored in DBs. The main problem with using these 
procedures is that an attacker may be able to execute them 
and damage database as well as the operating system and 
even other network components. Usually attackers know 
system stored procedures that come with different and almost 
easily can execute them. 
 
Into Outfile support: Some of RDBMS benefit from the 
INTO OUTFILE clause. In this condition an attacker can 
manipulate SQL queries then they produce a text file 
containing query results. If attackers can later gain access to 
this file, they can abuse the same information, for example, 
bypass authentication. 
 
Multiple statements: If the database supports UNION 
so, attacker has more chance because there are more attack 
methods for SQL injection. For instance, an additional 
INSERT statement could be added after a SELECT 
statement, causing two different queries to be executed. If 
this is performed in a login form, the attacker may add him 
or herself to the table of users. 
 
Sub-selects:  Supporting sub-selects is weakness for 
RDBMS when SQL injection is considered. For example, 
additional SELECT clauses can be inserted in WHERE 
clauses of the original SELECT clause. This weakness 
makes the web application more vulnerable, so they may be 
penetrated by malicious users easily. 
 
3.  SQL INJECTION ATTACK TYPES 
      There are different methods of attacks that depending on 
the goal of attacker are performed together or sequentially.  
For a successful SQLIA the attacker should append a 
syntactically correct command to the original SQL query. 
Now the following classification of SQLIAs [4, 20] will be 
presented. 
 
Tautologies: This type of attack injects SQL tokens to the 
conditional query statement to be evaluated always true. 
This type of attack used to bypass authentication control and 
access to data by exploiting vulnerable input field which use 
WHERE clause. 
"SELECT * FROM employee WHERE userid = '112' and 
password ='aaa' OR '1'='1'" 
As the tautology statement (1=1) has been added to the 
query statement so it is always true. 
 
llegal/Logically Incorrect Queries: when a query is 
rejected , an error message is returned from the database 
including useful debugging information. This error 
messages help attacker to find vulnerable parameters in the 
application and consequently database of the application. In 
fact attacker injects junk input or SQL tokens in query to 
produce syntax error, type mismatches, or logical errors by 
purpose. In this example attacker makes a type mismatch 
error by injecting the following text into the pin input field:  
1) Original URL: 
http://www.arch.polimi.it/eventi/?id_nav=8864 
2) SQL Injection: 
http://www.arch.polimi.it/eventi/?id_nav=8864' 
3) Error message showed: 
SELECT name FROM Employee WHERE id =8864\' 
 
From the message error we can find out name of table and 
fields: name; Employee; id.  By the gained information 
attacker can organize more strict attacks. 
 
Union Query:  By this technique, attackers join injected 
query to the safe query by the word UNION and then can 
get data about other tables from the application.  
Suppose for our examples that the query executed from the 
server is the following: 
SELECT Name, Phone FROM Users WHERE Id=$id 
By injecting the following Id value: 
 
$id=1 UNION ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1 FROM 
CreditCarTable 
We will have the following query: 
 
SELECT Name, Phone FROM Users WHERE Id=1 UNION 
ALL SELECT creditCardNumber,1 FROM CreditCarTable 
 
which will join the result of the original query with all the 
credit card users. 
 
Piggy-backed Queries: In this type of attack, intruders 
exploit database by the query delimiter, such as ";", to 
append extra query to the original query. With a successful 
attack database receives and execute a multiple distinct 
queries. Normally the first query is legitimate query, 
whereas following queries could be illegitimate. So attacker 
can inject any SQL command to the database. In the 
following example, attacker inject " 0; drop table user " into 
the  pin  input field instead of logical value. Then the 
application would produce the query: 
SELECT info FROM users WHERE login='doe' AND 
pin=0; drop table users  
Because of ";" character, database accepts both queries and 
executes them. The second query is illegitimate and can 
drop users table from the database. It is noticeable that some 
databases do not need special separation character in 
multiple distinct queries, so for detecting this type of attack, 
scanning for a special character is not impressive solution.         
 
Stored Procedure: Stored procedure is a part of database 
that programmer could set an extra abstraction layer on the 
database. As stored procedure could be coded by 
programmer, so, this part is as inject able as web application 
forms. Depend on specific stored procedure on the database 
there are different ways to attack. In the following example, 
attacker exploits parameterized stored procedure. 
CREATE PROCEDURE DBO.isAuthenticated 
@userName varchar2, @pass varchar2, @pin int 
AS 
EXEC("SELECT accounts FROM users 
WHERE login=’" +@userName+ "’ and pass=’" 
+@password+ 
"’ and pin=" +@pin); 
GO 
For authorized/unauthorized user the stored procedure 
returns true/false. As an SQLIA, intruder input “ ’ ; 
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stored procedure generates the following query: 
 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’doe’ 
AND pass=’ ’; SHUTDOWN; -- AND pin= 
 
After that, this type of attack works as piggy-back attack. 
The first original query is executed and consequently the 
second query which is illegitimate is executed and causes 
database shut down. So, it is considerable that stored 
procedures are as vulnerable as web application code. 
 
Inference:  By this type of attack, intruders change the 
behaviour of a database or application.There are two well-
known attack techniques that are based on inference: blind-
injection and timing attacks. 
 Blind Injection: Sometimes developers hide the error 
details which help attackers to compromise the database. In 
this situation attacker face to a generic page provided by 
developer, instead of an error message. So the SQLIA 
would be more difficult but not impossible. An attacker can 
still steal data by asking a series of True/False questions 
through SQL statements. Consider two possible injections 
into the login field:  
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’doe’ and 
1=0 -- AND pass= AND pin=0 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=’doe’ and 
1=1 -- AND pass= AND pin=0 
              If the application is secured, both queries would be 
unsuccessful, because of input validation. But if there is no 
input validation, the attacker can try the chance. First the 
attacker submit the first query and receives an error message 
because of "1=0". So the attacker does not understand the 
error is for input validation or for logical error in query. 
Then the attacker submits the second query which always 
true. If there is no login error message, then the attacker 
finds the login field vulnerable to injection. 
 
 Timing Attacks: A timing attack lets an attacker gather 
information from a database by observing timing delays in 
the database's responses. This technique by using if-then 
statement cause the SQL engine to execute a long running 
query or a time delay statement depending on the logic 
injected. This attack is similar to blind injection and attacker 
can then measure the time the page takes to load to 
determine if the injected statement is true. This technique 
uses an if-then statement for injecting queries. WAITFOR is 
a keyword along the branches, which causes the database to 
delay its response by a specified time. 
For example, in the following query:  
declare @s varchar(8000) select @s = db_name() if 
(ascii(substring(@s, 1, 1)) & ( power(2, 0))) > 0 waitfor 
delay '0:0:5'  
Database will pause for five seconds if the first bit of the 
first byte of the name of the current database is 1. Then code 
is then injected to generate a delay in response time when the 
condition is true. Also, attacker can ask a series of other 
questions about this character. As these examples show, the 
information is extracted from the database using a vulnerable 
parameter. 
 
Alternate Encodings:  In this technique, attackers modify 
the injection query by using alternate encoding, such as 
hexadecimal, ASCII, and Unicode. Because by this way they 
can escape from developer’s filter which scan input queries 
for special known "bad character". For example attacker use 
char (44) instead of single quote that is a bad character. This 
technique with join to other attack techniques could be 
strong, because it can target different layers in the 
application so developers need to be familiar to all of them to 
provide an effective defensive coding to prevent the alternate 
encoding attacks. By this technique, different attacks could 
be hidden in alternate encodings successfully.  
In the following example the pin field is injected with 
this string: "0; exec (0x73587574 64 5f77 6e)," and the result 
query is: 
 
SELECT accounts FROM users WHERE login=" AND 
pin=0; exec (char(0x73687574646f776e)) 
This example use the char () function and ASCII 
hexadecimal encoding. The char () function takes 
hexadecimal encoding of character(s) and returns the actual 
character(s). The stream of numbers in the second part of the 
injection is the ASCII hexadecimal encoding of the attack 
string. This encoded string is translated into the shutdown 
command by database when it is executed 
4.  SQL INJECTION DETECTION AND 
PREVENTION TOOLS 
Although developers deploy defensive coding or OS 
hardening but they are not enough to stop SQLIAs to web 
applications so researchers have proposed some of tools to 
assist developers. It is noticeable that there are more 
approaches that have not implemented as a tool yet. This 
paper emphasizes on tools not techniques. 
 
Huang and colleagues [18] propose WAVES, a black-
box technique for testing web applications for SQL injection 
vulnerabilities. The tool identify all points a web application 
that can be used to inject SQLIAs. It builds attacks that target 
these points and monitors the application how response to 
the attacks by utilize machine learning. 
 
JDBC-Checker [12, 13] was not developed with the intent 
of detecting and preventing general SQLIAs, but can be 
used to prevent attacks that take advantage of type 
mismatches in a dynamically-generated query string. As 
most of the SQLIAs consist of syntactically and type correct 
queries so this technique would not catch more general 
forms of these attacks. 
 
          CANDID [2, 7] modifies web applications written in 
Java through a program transformation. This tool 
dynamically mines the programmer-intended query structure 
on any input and detects attacks by comparing it against the 
structure of the actual query issued. CANDID’s natural and 
simple approach turns out to be very powerful for detection 
of SQL injection attacks. 
 
In SQL Guard [10] and SQL Check [5] queries are 
checked at runtime based on a model which is expressed as a 
grammar that only accepts legal queries. SQL Guard 
examines the structure of the query before and after the 
addition of user-input based on the model. In SQL Check, 
the model is specified independently by the developer. Both 
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parsing by the runtime checker, so security of the approach is 
dependent on attackers not being able to discover the key. In 
two approaches developer should to modify code to use a 
special intermediate library or manually insert special 
markers into the code where user input is added to a 
dynamically generated query. 
 
AMNESIA combines static analysis and runtime 
monitoring [16, 17]. In static phase, it builds models of the 
different types of queries which an application can legally 
generate at each point of access to the database.  Queries are 
intercepted before they are sent to the database and are 
checked against the statically built models, in dynamic 
phase. Queries that violate the model are prevented from 
accessing to the database. The primary limitation of this tool 
is that its success is dependent on the accuracy of its static 
analysis for building query models. 
 
      WebSSARI [15] use static analysis to check taint flows 
against preconditions for sensitive functions. It works based 
on sanitized input that has passed through a predefined set of 
filters. The limitation of approach is adequate preconditions 
for sensitive functions cannot be accurately expressed so 
some filters may be omitted. 
 
SecuriFly [14] is another tool that was implemented for 
java. Despite of other tool, chases string instead of character 
for taint information. SecurityFly tries to sanitize query 
strings that have been generated using tainted input but 
unfortunately injection in numeric fields cannot stop by this 
approach.  Difficulty of identifying all sources of user input 
is the main limitation of this approach. 
 
Positive tainting [1] not only focuses on positive tainting 
rather than negative tainting but also it is automated and does 
need developer intervention. Moreover this approach 
benefits from syntax-aware evaluation, which gives 
developers a mechanism to regulate the usage of string data 
based not only on its source, but also on its syntactical role in 
a query string. 
 
      IDS [6] use an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) to 
detect SQLIAs, based on a machine learning technique. The 
technique builds models of the typical queries and then at 
runtime, queries that do not match the model would be 
identified as attack. This tool detects attacks successfully but 
it depends on training seriously. Else, many false positives 
and false negatives would be generated. 
 
Another approach in this category is SQL-IDS [8] which 
focus on writing specifications for the web application that 
describe the intended structure of SQL statements that are 
produced by the application, and in automatically monitoring 
the execution of these SQL statements for violations with 
respect to these specifications. 
 
       SQLPrevent [11] is consists of an HTTP request 
interceptor. The original data flow is modified when 
SQLPrevent is deployed into a web server. The HTTP 
requests are saved into the current thread-local storage. 
Then, SQL interceptor intercepts the SQL statements that 
are made by web application and pass them to the SQLIA 
detector module. Consequently, HTTP request from thread-
local storage is fetched and examined to determine whether 
it contains an SQLIA. The malicious SQL statement would 
be prevented to be sent to database, if it is suspicious to 
SQLIA. 
 
       Swaddler [3], analyzes the internal state of a web 
application. It works based on both single and multiple 
variables and shows an impressive way against complex 
attacks to web applications. First the approach describes the 
normal values for the application’s state variables in critical 
points of the application’s components. Then, during the 
detection phase, it monitors the application’s execution to 
identify abnormal states. 
5.  EVALUATION 
       In this section, the SQL injection detection or prevention 
tools presented in section IV would be compared. It is 
noticeable that this comparison is based on the evaluation 
which the authors of tools have done empirically. They used 
a testbed for their tool. In particular, they used a set of web 
applications and a set of inputs for those applications that 
included both legitimate inputs and SQLIAs.   
5.1  Comparison of SQL Injection Detection/Prevention 
Tools Based on Attack Types 
 Proposed tools were compared to assess whether it was 
capable of addressing the different attack types presented in 
Section III. It is noticeable that this comparison is based on 
the articles not empirically experience. 
 
 Tables 1 summarize the results of this comparison. The 
symbol “” is used for tool that can successfully stop all 
attacks of that type. The symbol “-” is used for tool that is 
not able to stop attacks of that type. The symbol “” refers to 
tool that the attack type only partially because of natural 
limitations of the underlying approach.  
 
Table1: Comparison of Tools with Respect to Attack Types 
 
 
As the table shows the stored procedure is a critical 
attack which is difficult for some tools to stop it. It is 
consisting of queries that can execute on the database. 
However, most of tools consider only the queries that 
generate within application. So, this type of attack make 
serious problem for some tools. 
 
5.2. Comparison of SQL Injection Detection/Prevention 
Tools Based on Deployment Requirement 
Each tool with respect to the following criteria was 
evaluated: (1) Does the tool require developers to modify 
their code base? (2) What is the degree of automation of the 
detection aspect of the tool? (3) What is the degree of 
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infrastructure (not including the tool itself) is needed to 
successfully use the tool? The results of this classification 
are summarized in Table2. 
 
Table2: Comparison of Tools Based on Deployment Requirements 
 
 
Table2 determines the degree of automation of tool in 
detection or prevention of attacks. Actually automatically 
detection and prevention is ability of tool that provides user 
satisfaction. Also table shows that which tool needs to 
modify the source code of application. Moreover, additional 
infrastructure that is required for each tool that usually leads 
to inconvenience for users is illustrated. 
5.3Comparison of Tools Based on Evaluation Parameters 
The authors of proposed tools have evaluated their tools 
in common parameters: efficiency, effectiveness and 
performance, flexibility and stability. The results of this 
classification are summarized in Table 3. Definition of the 
measured parameters [11]: 
 
Efficiency 
  False positive: is a false alarm. It is when the tool 
incorrectly categorizes a benign request being as a 
malicious attack. 
  False negative: occurs when a malicious attack is 
not recognized, so the tool lets it pass normally. 
 
 
 
 
 
Effectiveness 
  Attacks Detection: the percentage of real attacks, 
correctly detected. 
  Attacks Prevention: the percentage of real attacks 
correctly blocked after being detected. 
 
Flexibility 
  Different Types of SQLIAs: the ability of the tool 
to detect/prevent different types of SQL Injection 
attacks such as those were presented in section II. 
Performance 
  Detection Overhead: is the time spent for a 
detection of a SQLIA once the tool is running. 
  Prevention Overhead: is the time spent to detect 
and block (prevent) a SQLIA once the tool is 
running. 
 
Stability 
  Environment Independence 
o  Web Applications: the possibility to test 
the tool on different types of web 
applications, such as open 
source/commercial, large/small. 
o  Databases: testing on web applications 
that use different backend databases, such 
as open source (e.g. MySQL) commercial 
(e.g. Oracle). 
o  Programming Languages: the ability of 
the tool to work on web applications 
written in different programming 
languages, such as J2EE, .NET, PHP and 
so On. 
o  Operating Systems: the ability of the tool 
to run on different OS such as Windows 
and Linux. 
o  Application Servers: the possibility to 
run the tool in a network using different 
type of Application Server such Tomcat. 
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Based on the table4, different criteria such as efficiency, 
effectiveness, stability, flexibility and performance for 
choosing an appropriate tool could be considered. For 
example the table shows that which programming language 
could be supported by the specific tool. Also, by flexibility, 
types of SQL injection attack which are addressed by the 
tool could be identified. “All” means that the tool can stop 
all type of attack successfully and “All/p” means that the 
tool can stop all the attack type partially. 
 
On the other hand, we believe that the value of some 
evaluation parameters such as efficiency, effectiveness and 
performance is depend on testbed that have been used by 
each author such as equipments, tools and scripts for attack  
so the value of these parameters may change in empirically 
evaluation in a common testbed. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we presented the various types of SQLIAs. 
Then we investigated SQL injection detection and 
prevention tools. After that we compared these tools in 
terms of their ability to stop SQLIA.  
 
In addition, the current tools were compared based on 
deployment requirement (modifying source code, additional 
infrastructure and automation of detection or prevention) 
and common evaluation parameters (efficiency, 
effectiveness, stability, flexibility and performance).  
  In our future work we will propose a framework for 
measuring effectiveness, efficiency, stability and 
performance of tools in common criteria to prove the 
strength and weakness of them.  
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